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Fairness and the optimal allocation of ownership rights
Abstract
We report on several experiments on the optimal allocation of ownership rights. The experiments
confirm the property rights approach by showing that the ownership structure affects
relationship-specific investments and that subjects attain the most efficient ownership allocation despite
starting from different initial conditions. However, in contrast to the property rights approach, the most
efficient ownership structure is joint ownership. These results cannot be explained by the self-interest
model nor by models that assume that all people behave fairly, but they are largely consistent with
approaches that focus on the interaction between selfish and fair players.
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Small firms in service industries such as law, consulting, accounting, advertising and 
medicine are often organized as partnerships. In these firms relationship specific investments 
seem to be important and particularly difficult to contract upon. We often observe that these 
firms are governed by a very simple governance structure: The partners jointly own the assets 
of the firm and share profits. This observation is inconsistent with the modern property rights 
approach pioneered by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) who argue that 
joint ownership is rarely optimal:1 If two parties jointly own an asset they can prevent each 
other from using it which minimizes their investment incentives. They argue that it would be 
better to give all the ownership rights to one party which improves this party’s incentives 
without reducing the incentives of the other party. However, this argument ignores the 
possibility that a partnership may promote cooperation and investment incentives by 
appealing to fairness and reciprocity. The purpose of our paper is to reexamine the optimal 
allocation of ownership rights by combining the property rights approach with recent insights 
into the nature of social preferences and fairness driven behavior.  
The first part of the paper reports on several experiments on the optimal allocation of 
ownership rights. There are two players who can generate a joint surplus with an asset (the 
“firm”). At the initial stage they can decide either to have joint ownership of the firm, or to 
have one of the parties as the sole owner who hires the other party as an employee. The two 
parties can then make relationship-specific investments that increase the joint surplus to be 
generated. Finally the surplus is shared according to the ex ante chosen allocation of 
ownership rights. We are interested in two main questions: first, which ownership structure is 
(second-best) efficient, in the sense that it induces the most efficient investment decisions by 
the two parties? Second, do the experimental subjects set up the (second best) efficient 
ownership structure ex ante, no matter what initial ownership structure they start from?  
Our experiments confirm the property rights approach by showing that the ownership 
structure affects relationship-specific investments and that the large majority of the subjects 
achieve the most efficient ownership allocation despite starting from different initial 
conditions. However, in our experiments the most efficient ownership structure turns out to be 
joint ownership, contrasting with the predictions of the property rights approach. 
                                                 
1 The earlier literature on property rights comes to somewhat different conclusions. Coase (1960) emphasizes 
that the clear definition of property rights is of crucial importance for economic efficiency. However, the “Coase 
Theorem” implies that economic efficiency does not depend on whom ownership rights are allocated to. In the 
absence of any transaction costs, any (well defined) allocation of ownership rights implements an efficient 
outcome. Williamson (1985) points out that if the parties can write complete contingent contracts, an appropriate 
set of incentive contracts can mimic any ownership structure, making the allocation of ownership rights 
irrelevant. 
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We offer a theoretical interpretation of the experimental results in the second part of 
the paper. The property rights approach is based on the self-interest model that assumes that 
all parties are only interested in their own material payoffs. However, both a large number of 
experiments and systematic field evidence demonstrate that concerns for fairness and 
reciprocity play an important role in motivating the behavior of many people.2 Several 
experiments (e.g. Fehr, Gächter, and Kirchsteiger, 1997, and Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt, 2007) 
indicate that if contracts are incomplete, fairness may act as an enforcement device that 
complements (and sometimes substitutes for) explicit incentives that are enforced by the 
courts.  
In Section 5, we compare the predictions of the self-interest model to those of two 
other approaches. The first approach assumes that all parties are fair-minded. We show that 
the allocation of ownership rights does not matter in this case because fairness suffices as an 
enforcement device for inducing both parties to invest efficiently regardless of who owns the 
firm. However, this prediction is not confirmed by the experimental evidence. First, fairness 
concerns apparently did not suffice as an enforcement device to achieve the first best because 
neither under joint ownership nor under individual ownership did both parties invest 
efficiently. Second, this approach fails to explain why relatively high investment levels are 
induced under joint ownership whereas under individual ownership investments are far less 
efficient.  
The second approach acknowledges that people differ. Some people seem to care quite 
strongly about fairness, while other people seem to be mainly self-interested. Furthermore, 
people often do not know whether they are interacting with a fair-minded or a self-interested 
opponent. Using the Fehr-Schmidt (1999) model of inequity aversion, we show that, as in 
Hart (1995), no ownership structure implements first best investments and that the allocation 
of ownership rights does matter. However, in contrast to Hart (1995), joint ownership is 
predicted to be the most efficient ownership structure. Thus, the second approach captures the 
major experimental regularities regarding investment behavior. Moreover, this approach also 
predicts that the second best efficient ownership allocation will be implemented regardless of 
the initial ownership structure, which is what we observed in the experiments.  
The question which allocation of ownership rights is optimal is a question about the 
incentive properties of different governance structures. It is difficult to empirically address 
this question by using field data. As has been emphasized by Chiappori and Salanié (2003), 
                                                 
2 See Camerer (2003) and Fehr and Schmidt (2003) for recent surveys on this literature. 
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problems of unobserved heterogeneity and endogenous selection often complicate clean 
inferences about the incentive effects of contracts and governance structures in field data. In 
our context these problems may result in an ambiguous interpretation of correlations between 
different ownership structures and different behaviors. Does a particular ownership structure 
induce a particular type of behavior or are behavioral differences across ownership rights the 
result of self-selection of heterogeneous individuals to different allocations of ownership 
rights? This problem is – in our view – particularly severe in the context of fairness 
preferences because there is little hope that non-experimental field data allow the control for 
such preferences. However, our experiments can address this problem because we can 
observe the behavior of the same individuals under different ownership structures.  
Our paper is related to several experimental papers on the hold-up problem. Hackett 
(1994) was the first to investigate the impact of relationship-specific investments on ex-post 
bargaining outcomes experimentally. Similar studies include Gantner, Güth and Königstein 
(2001), Königstein and Tietz (2000) and Oosterbeek, Sonnemans and van Velzen (2003). All 
of these papers show that concerns for fairness mitigate the hold-up problem. Ellingsen and 
Johannesson (2004a, b) look at the role of communication as well as that of threats and 
promises for inducing efficient investments in a hold-up problem with one-sided investments. 
Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004a, b) apply the Fehr-Schmidt (1999) model of inequity 
aversion to their experiments and show that this model fits the data much better than does the 
self-interest model. However, none of these papers considers different allocations of 
ownership rights and how they affect investment incentives. Moreover, these papers do not 
examine the endogenous determination of property rights, which is one of the key questions in 
our paper. Our paper is also related to Fehr and Schmidt (2004) and Fehr, Klein and Schmidt 
(2007) which also focus on the importance of the interaction between selfish and fair types. 
However, in these papers we report on principal-agent experiments in which the principal can 
choose whether to use an explicit (but incomplete) incentive contract that is enforced by the 
courts or an implicit contract that uses concerns for fairness as an enforcement device. The 
current paper, in contrast, has a very different focus and examines the conditions under which 
individual or joint property rights are efficient and whether the parties involved are able to 
implement the efficient solution regardless of the initial status quo.  
There are a few theoretical models showing that joint ownership may sometimes be 
optimal. Levin and Tadelis (2005) argue (as we do) that the defining feature of a partnership 
is the (linear) redistribution of profits among partners. Their model complements ours by 
focusing on the effect of profit sharing on the selection of employees or partners rather than 
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on the incentive effects. Levin and Tadelis consider markets for services where it is difficult 
to assess service quality. In these markets firms have an incentive to suboptimally hire low 
ability workers. A profit sharing partnership mitigates this problem. As was first observed by 
Ward (1958), the members of a partnership will not admit an additional partner if his 
contribution to revenues is smaller than the average revenue per partner, even if his marginal 
contribution is positive. Thus, a partnership is more reluctant to admit additional partners, 
which is beneficial if it counteracts the incentive to hire too many (low quality) employees.  
Rajan and Zingales (1998) consider how the interaction of access to critical resources 
and ownership rights on assets affects investment incentives. In contrast to Hart and Moore 
(1990) they show that the ownership of an asset may reduce investment incentives. In their 
set-up collective ownership may be beneficial because it may distribute the adverse effects of 
ownership more efficiently.  
Halonen (2002) considers a repeated relationship. In the one-shot game, joint 
ownership is the worst possible ownership structure, as it minimizes investment incentives. 
However, in the infinitely repeated game this ownership structure is desirable because it 
provides the strongest punishment possibilities if one of the parties deviates. Bar-Isaac 
(forthcoming) also considers a repeated relationship where two players may want to form a 
partnership in order to pool their reputations. An individual with an established reputation 
cannot credibly commit to exerting effort when working alone. However, by hiring and 
working with a junior partner, he has an incentive to invest into the reputation of his partner 
that affects the value of the partnership.  
None of these papers considers the effects of fairness which we show to be empirically 
important for the optimal ownership allocation. Furthermore, these papers implicitly assume 
that the most efficient ownership structure will always prevail. In contrast, we explicitly allow 
the trading of property rights. Thus, our experiments examine empirically whether efficient 
property rights will indeed be implemented.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up a simple problem of the 
allocation of ownership rights. Experimental procedures are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 
presents the experimental results. We offer a theoretical analysis of the experiment under 
different assumption about preferences and concerns for fairness in Section 5. Section 6 
concludes the paper.   
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1.  A Simple Model of the Allocation of Ownership Rights 
Consider two players, called A and B, who can generate a joint surplus if they have access to 
a physical asset (called the “firm”). The gross surplus  depends on the investments ( , )v a b
a a≥  and b b≥  the two players undertake sequentially. Investments are personally costly 
with investment costs given by  and , respectively. For simplicity, let us assume 
that the problem is symmetric in the sense that c
( )Ac a ( )Bc b
A(⋅) = cB(⋅) = c(⋅) and v(a,b) = v(b,a). Suppose 
that B chooses his investment level first, and that A observes B’s investment before she has to 
invest herself. Let the first best investment levels be denoted by   and ,  
B
−
*a *b
  (1) ( *, *) arg max ( , ) arg max ( , ) ( ) ( ),a b S a b v a b c a c b= = −
and further suppose that they are uniquely defined and satisfy *a > a  and *b b> , 
respectively.  
The investments are assumed to be unobservable to outsiders, so that any investments 
above the minimum investment levels a  and b  cannot be contracted upon. However, at some 
initial stage 0, the two parties can contractually determine the allocation of ownership rights 
on the firm and thus establish the control of the physical assets that are required for 
production. If one of the parties, say A, is the sole owner of the firm, she then has to hire B at 
a fixed wage w as an employee. In this case monetary payoffs are given by 
 
( , ) ( )
( )
A
B
M v a b w c a
M w c b
= − −
= −  (2) 
Clearly, a self-interested B player will choose b=b  because the marginal return on his 
investment is zero. The A player, however, is full residual claimant on the margin and will 
invest efficiently (given B’s investment). The case of B-ownership is symmetric. 
If both parties own the firm jointly, then they share the gross returns of the project 
equally and payoffs are  
 
0.5 ( , ) ( )
0.5 ( , ) ( )
A
B
M v a b c a
M v a b c b
= −
= −  (3) 
 
In this case, each player gets half of the marginal return of his investment, meaning that self-
interested players will also not invest efficiently under joint ownership.  
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This model is reminiscent of Hart (1995), but there are a few notable differences. First 
of all, in Hart (1995) parties invest simultaneously while we look at the case of sequential 
investments. From the point of view of the self-interest model this does not make much of a 
difference.3 However, it helps the parties to coordinate their expectations in the experiment. 
With simultaneous investments it is impossible to distinguish whether the decision not to 
contribute to the joint project is driven by selfishness or by the (possibly mistaken) belief that 
the other player is not going to contribute, too. Because our experiments focus on the effects 
of fairness, we want to exclude this possible confound. Furthermore, in the real world parties 
are often able to condition their own contributions on the contributions of their partners. 
Secondly, Hart (1995) considers a three-stage game: At date 0 parties negotiate the 
ownership structure, at date 1 investments are made, and at date 2 parties bargain on how to 
split the surplus. If this structure was implemented in the experiment, players would have to 
bargain twice. They would have to form beliefs at stage 0 on how the surplus will be split at 
date 2 which in turn affects their behavior in the negotiations on the allocation of ownership 
rights at date 0 and their investments at date 1. The problem is that it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to control for these beliefs in a convincing way. Therefore, we decided to replace 
the bargaining at date 2 by the fixed payoff functions (2) and (3). These payoff functions 
capture the idea that the owner of the asset can appropriate a larger share of the surplus than a 
non-owner.4   
Parties negotiate the allocation of ownership rights before investments are made. The 
property rights theory (based on the self-interest model) claims that the parties will always 
agree on the most efficient ownership structure (i.e. on A- or B-ownership) regardless of the 
initial allocation of ownership rights. We consider two different treatments in order to test this 
hypothesis: 
                                                 
3 If both players invest simultaneously and if investments are complements at the margin, it is easy to show that 
both players will underinvest (see, e.g. Hart and Moore, 1990, Proposition 1). With sequential investments, 
however, B takes the fact that his actual investment level may affect the optimal investment level of A into 
account. Thus, in general it cannot be ruled out that B overinvests (see Noldeke and Schmidt, 1998, Proposition 
1). However, with the parameterization of our experiments there is underinvestment in equilibrium under any 
ownership structure.  
4 These payoff functions are identical to the endougenously derived payoff functions in Hart (1995) in the case 
of investments in a physical asset. If the investment is in a physical asset and A is the sole owner of this asset, 
she has full access to the returns of B’s investment b, even without B’s consent. Thus, she gets v(a,b) on the 
margin, while B gets 0. If both parties own the asset, each of them can block the other from using the asset, so 
they share the surplus equally. Of course, investments may also be in human capital. In this case A would not 
have access to B’s investment (which is embodied in B rather than in the asset) even if she is the sole owner of 
the asset. How A and B split the surplus now depends on how the investments affect their outside options. This 
is slightly more difficult to model explicitly. See Hart (1995, p. 68) and Noldeke and Schmidt (1998) for a more 
detailed discussion of investments in human and in physical capital. Note that joint ownership is never optimal 
with investments in human assets while it may be optimal with investments in physical assets. However, we have 
chosen the parameters of the experiment such that A- (or B-)ownership always dominates joint ownership if 
parties are self-interested (see Section 3 below).      
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• Joint Ownership Design (JOD and JOD-C): The two parties start out with joint 
ownership.  At stage 0, A can either choose to retain joint ownership or she can offer 
to sell her share of the firm to B at price .  t
• A-Ownership Design (AOD): Player A is the single owner of the firm when the game 
starts. At stage 0, A can choose to remain the sole owner of the firm and to hire B as 
an “employee” at a fixed wage . Alternatively, A can choose to make B a co-owner 
by giving him half of the firm.  
w
 
Our main questions are, first, whether A-ownership is indeed more efficient than joint 
ownership and, second, whether parties manage to achieve the most efficient ownership 
structure independent of the initial ownership structure. 
 
2. Experimental Design and Procedures 
We used the following parameterization of this investment problem in our experiments. The 
two parties choose { }, 1,...,10a b∈ . Investments (a,b) yield a gross surplus 
, while investment costs are ( , ) 22 ( )v a b a b= ⋅ + ( ) 12Ac a a=  and . Thus, 
investments are neither complements nor substitutes at the margin, implying that optimal 
investment levels are independent of each other. 
( ) 12Bc b b=
Given these parameters of the experiment, the efficient investment levels are given by 
a*=b*=10, yielding a joint surplus of 200. However, the self-interest model predicts that no 
ownership structure implements efficient investments. With joint ownership, each party 
receives only half of the gross surplus, leaving the private marginal return on investment 
under its marginal cost and inducing both parties to choose minimum investment levels, 
a=b=1. If one party is the sole owner of the firm, then this party receives the full gross 
surplus on the margin and has an incentive to invest efficiently. The other party, however, 
receives a fixed wage and will therefore choose the minimum investment level of 1. Thus, 
both possible ownership structures are inefficient, but A- or B-ownership is more efficient 
than joint ownership.  
 The time structure of the experiments is as follows. There is an ownership allocation 
game at stage 0, followed by an investment game at stage 1. The ownership allocation game 
differs in the different treatments, while the structure of the investment game is always the 
same. We consider two main treatments and one control treatment. 
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• Joint Ownership Design (JOD): Initially, both parties own the firm jointly. A can 
choose  
o either to retain joint ownership, in which case each party earns 50% of the joint 
surplus 
o or to offer to sell her share of the firm to B at price t . If B accepts this offer, he 
earns 100% of the gross surplus v(a,b), while A receives the fixed payment t. If 
B rejects, the game ends and both parties receive a payoff of zero. 
• A-Ownership Design (AOD): A is the sole owner of the firm when the game starts. A 
has two options.  
o To remain the sole owner of the firm, in which case she gets 100% of the gross 
surplus v(a,b), and to hire B as an “employee” at a fixed wage . If B accepts 
the wage offer the game moves to the investment stage; if B rejects both 
players receive a zero payoff. 
w
o To make B a co-owner by giving him half of the firm. In this case, each party 
gets 50% of the gross surplus if player B accepts the offered share; if B rejects, 
both players receive zero payoff.5  
• Control Treatment (JOD-C): This treatment is identical to the Joint Ownership Design 
except for one detail. If B rejects A’s offer, then the game does not end but continues 
under joint ownership. This design is more natural than treatment JOD because the 
two parties would want to continue their relationship on the basis of the status quo 
after an offer has been rejected. The control treatment enhances the chances for sole 
ownership because player A need not worry that the surplus is lost if her offer gets 
rejected. Therefore, we expect player A to offer her ownership share for sale more 
frequently. We start out with JOD rather than with JOD-C because in the former 
treatment expectations on what is going to happen if negotiations break down cannot 
affect behavior. Therefore, treatment JOD allows for a “cleaner” experimental 
analysis. By comparing JOD to JOD-C we can then see what the effect of these 
expectations is.  
After the allocation of ownership rights has been determined at stage 0, the investment 
game is played at stage 1:  
                                                 
5 We did not use the expressions “employee” and “partner” in the actual experiments, but the neutral terms 
“actor A” and “actor B” instead.  
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• First player B chooses his investment level b.  
• Then player A is informed of b and subsequently chooses her investment level a.  
Finally, payoffs are made according to the investment levels and the allocation of ownership 
rights.  
The experiments were conducted at the University of Munich with undergraduate 
students in law, political science, engineering, etc. We conducted a total of eight experimental 
sessions. Four sessions (S1–S4) implemented the Joint Ownership Design (JOD), two 
sessions (S5-S6) implemented the A-Ownership Design, and two additional sessions (S7 and 
S8) implemented the control treatment (JOD-C). We had 20-24 subjects in each session, half 
of them in the role of player A, the other half in the role of player B. The two groups were 
located in separate but adjacent rooms. All subjects had to read the instructions and to solve 
several exercises before the experiment started, to make sure that they all understood the rules 
of the experiment. We had ten rounds in each session; in each round the A and B players were 
matched with new partners. Thus, we have 10-12 contracts with 10 different anonymous 
contracting partners for each subject in each experimental session.  
The subjects computed their own payoffs and that of their opponents after each round. 
In order to rule out the possibility of reputation building, the outcome of each round was 
strictly confidential, that is, each pair of players observed only what happened in their own 
relationship. They neither observed the contracts chosen by or offered to the other subjects in 
the room nor their current partner’s past behavior. Furthermore, the matching was such that 
each player A (B) was matched to a different anonymous player B (A) in each period. Finally, 
the subjects collected their total monetary payoffs privately and anonymously at the end of the 
session. Each session lasted for about one and a half hours. A complete set of the instructions 
for all our experiments can be found on our webpage.6  
All participants received an initial endowment of € 10.00 in each session (≈US $ 12.50 
at the time of the experiment). The experimental (token) payoffs were exchanged into money 
at the rate of 1 token = € 0.03. Thus, A and B could jointly earn a maximum surplus of € 6 in 
each of the ten rounds. On average, the subjects earned € 28.42 (≈US $35.25), an hourly wage 
of about € 18.95 (≈US $23.70).  
 
                                                 
6 The full set of all our experimental instructions, in the original German and translated into English, are 
available at http://www.vwl.uni-muenchen.de/ls_schmidt/experiments/property_rights/index.htm .  
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3. Experimental Results 
3.1. Joint Ownership Design 
 
In the Joint Ownership Design (JOD) each party initially owned 50% of the firm. At stage 0, 
player A could either choose to retain joint ownership or to sell her ownership stake to player 
B. We conducted four sessions (S1-S4) of this design with a total of 470 observations. The 
major ownership patterns which emerged in this treatment can be summarized as follows: 
Result 1: In the large majority of cases, A players stick to joint ownership. If A 
players offer to sell their ownership stake to B, B rejects these offers in 
about 30% of all cases.  
Support for Result 1 is provided by Figure 1 and the following statistics: A players prefer 
joint ownership in 300 out of 470 (63.8%) cases. In the remaining 170 cases (36.2%), A 
players attempt to sell their ownership stake to B players. The latter reject these offers in 
almost one-third of the cases (52 times). Therefore, B-ownership was established in only 118 
cases (25.1% of all observations). Figure 1 shows the evolution of the relative share of cases 
in which joint ownership prevailed and in which B-ownership is either proposed and accepted 
or proposed and rejected. Recall that if A’s offer to sell her share is rejected, the game ends 
and both parties earn a payoff of zero. The share of joint ownership varies roughly between 60 
and 70% of the cases, whereas accepted B-ownership varies between 20 and 30% of the cases. 
There is no time trend in the data.7
                                                 
7 A random-effects GLS regression shows that the probability of choosing joint ownership goes down by 1% per 
period, but this effect is not significant at the 5% level (p=0.068). 
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Fig. 1: Share of Ownership Choices (JOD) 
 
Result 1 clearly contradicts the self-interest model, which predicts the choice of B-ownership 
because it supposedly induces more efficient investment behavior. In order to understand this 
result, we have to analyze the actual investment behavior of the two players, depending on 
whether joint ownership or B-ownership prevailed. We first consider those cases where player 
A preferred joint ownership:  
Result 2: If A decides to stick to joint ownership in the JOD, A’s investment is 
strongly increasing in B’s investment level. There is, however, significant 
heterogeneity in A’s investment response.  
Even though it is a dominant strategy for a self-interested player A to choose a=1 
under joint ownership, many A players reciprocate high investment levels of player B by 
choosing a high investment level themselves. Figure 2 illustrates this, depicting how the 
average investment level of player A responds to B’s investment level. The figure shows that 
A’s average investment is increasing in B’s investment. This increase is particularly strong if 
B invests more than b = 6. On average player A chooses a = 6.7.  
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Fig. 2: A’s Average Investment Given b under Joint Ownership (JOD) 
 
Statistical analyses (see Table 1) also support the reciprocal pattern of A’s investment 
response. Regression (1) is a simple OLS regression of A’s investment on B’s investment.8 
The standard errors in this regression ignore the possibility that the A players' investment 
levels may not be independent of each other because each A player invested several times. 
Therefore, we treat the observations of each individual A player as a separate cluster in 
regression (2). The standard errors in this case are based on the assumption that the 
investment levels are independent across different A players, but allow for dependent 
observations within each cluster (i.e. for all observations belonging to one A player). The 
assumption that investments are independent across A players is reasonable because an A 
player never had the opportunity of observing what other A players did. Both regression (1) 
and (2) show that the impact of b on a is sizeable and highly significant. In fact, these 
regressions indicate that an increase in B’s investment level by one unit increases A's 
expected investment level by 0.89 units. Therefore, the expected marginal return of one 
additional unit of investment for player B is  
 1 22(1 0.89) 12 8.79 0
2
+ − = >  (4) 
. 
                                                 
8 We also conducted Tobit regressions to check the robustness of our results. All variables that are significant in 
the OLS regressions are also significant in the Tobit regression and they exhibit the same sign.  
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Thus, if player B maximizes his expected monetary income, the choice of b=10 is optimal. 
 
Table 1  
A’s Investment as a Function of b under Joint Ownership (JOD) 
 
Dependent variable: 
A’s investment a 
(1) 
(robust 
standard 
errors) 
(2) 
(robust 
standard errors 
& clusters) 
(3) 
(robust 
standard 
errors) 
(4) 
(robust 
standard errors 
& clusters) 
 Based on data from JOD Based on data from AOD 
 
Constant -0.11 
(0.38) 
-0.11 
(0.83) 
-0.70 
(0.51) 
-0.70 
(0.54) 
B’s investment b 0.89*** 
(0.04) 
0.89*** 
(0.09) 
0.81*** 
(0.07) 
0.81*** 
(0.10) 
No. of observations 300 300 187 187 
Adjusted R2 0.57 0.57 0.21 0.21 
Table 1 reports the coefficients of OLS regressions. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.  
Although A players respond, on average, quite strongly to increases in the investment 
level of player B, it is important to notice that there are substantial differences in individual 
behavior. In many cases the A players exactly matched the investment level of B but there are 
also a substantial number of cases where A players did not fully reciprocate B’s choice. In 
fact, in 28.3% of the cases the A player chose the minimal investment level of a = 1 and in 
25% of the cases a < b prevailed. Thus, a sizeable fraction of A players was mainly driven by 
self-interest.  
Table 2 shows that most B players trusted that A players will reciprocate. 60% of all B 
players (180 of 300) under joint ownership chose the efficient investment level  at stage 
1. Only 41 B players (13.7%) chose the minimum investment level b=1, and the average 
investment of B players amounted to 7.7. This result contrasts sharply with the prediction of 
the self-interest model that forecasts B players will invest nothing. 
10b =
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Table 2 
Investments (b,a) under Joint Ownership (JOD) 
               
 b\a  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Σ   
               
 1  37     1    3 41  
 2  5 3        1 9  
 3  2 1 1        4  
 4  3 1  1    1   6  
 5  10 1  2 4      17  
 6  7 1    3 1    12  
 7  3    1 3 5   1 13  
 8  4     1 1 1  1 8  
 9  3      1  6  10  
 10  11 1   3 3 1 2 2 157 180  
 Σ   85 8 1 3 8 11 9 4 8 163 300  
             
 
 
 
Let us now compare the outcome of joint ownership to the case where A tried to sell her 
ownership share to B.  
Result 3: In the JOD joint ownership is the more efficient allocation of ownership 
rights. Total investment (a+b) is higher if joint ownership prevails and 
both players receive a higher average payoff if A decides to retain joint 
ownership rather than selling her ownership rights to B.  
A’s average income is 77.5 under joint ownership, while B earned an average of 66.4. If A 
offered to sell her ownership stake to B, average payoffs are 67.9 and 12.8 respectively. Thus, 
it turns out that the payoff difference between A and B is fairly small (but statistically 
significant) under joint ownership, but very large if A offered her ownership stake for sale. 
Furthermore, joint ownership Pareto-dominates B-ownership. Figure 3 shows that both 
players were better off with joint ownership rather than with B-ownership in all periods 
(except for period 1). Again, these differences are statistically significant.9  
                                                 
9 A Mann-Whitney test shows that A’s payoff under joint ownership is significantly larger than that of B under 
joint ownership (p=0.0003) and is also significantly larger than A’s payoff if she tried to sell her ownership stake 
to B (p=0.0001). 
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Fig. 3: Payoffs under Joint Ownership and B-Ownership (JOD) 
 
To better understand why joint ownership is more successful, consider the 170 out of 470 
cases (36.2%) where A tried to sell her ownership stake to B. Recall that these offers were 
rejected quite often (in 52 cases, i.e. 30.6% of all offers). The average price of the rejected 
offers was 176.9, while the average price of the accepted offers was just 120.8.10 If the seller 
accepts the offer and invests b=10 himself while A invest a=1 (which are the dominant 
strategies for self-interested players if B becomes the sole owner), then B’s payoff is 
22(10 1) 12 10 122BM t= + − ⋅ − = t− . Thus, accepting a price offer in excess of 122 only pays 
off if B expects A to invest considerably more than 1a = . However, in fact, A invested 1a =  
in 85 out of the 118 cases (72%) where she sold her ownership stake successfully to B, and 
her average investment level in these cases was just 1.9, while virtually all B players (111 out 
of 118) chose . In comparison, B invested 10b = 7.7b = and A invested on average 
under joint ownership. Thus, offering B-ownership is less efficient than retaining joint 
ownership for two reasons: first, the sales offer was frequently rejected. Second, even if the 
sales offer was accepted total investment was lower than under joint ownership.  
6.7a =
 
                                                 
10 In fact, a Mann-Whitney Test confirms that the differences between the accepted and rejected offers are highly 
statistically significant (p=0.0000). 
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3.2.  A-Ownership Design 
 
We now turn to the results of the A-Ownership design where A players could choose between 
sticking to A-ownership or giving away half of the revenues of the project to the other player. 
We observed a total of 230 contractual choices in sessions S5 and S6. The major ownership 
patterns under initial A-ownership are summarized in  
Result 4: The overwhelming majority of A players opted to make B the joint owner of 
the project. There is no significant time trend. If anything, the share of joint 
ownership increases over time.  
Figure 4 supports Result 4, showing the relative share of joint ownership and A-ownership 
over time. Joint ownership is implemented in 80 – 90% of the cases from period 3 onwards.11 
Overall, joint ownership was chosen in 81.3% of all cases (187 of 230 observations). Thus, A 
players clearly preferred joint ownership.  
 
0%
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60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Period
Joint ownership
A ownership
 
 
Fig. 4: Share of Ownership Choices (AOD) 
 
 
The next result shows that the reason for this preference is similar to that in the JOD.  
                                                 
11 A random-effects GLS regression shows that the probability of choosing JO goes up by 1.2% per year, but the 
effect is hardly significant (p=0.056). 
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Result 5: If A makes B a co-owner, more than two thirds of all B players trust A 
players and choose b=10. In fact, A’s average investment is strongly 
increasing in B’s investment level, such that b=10 is the choice that 
maximizes B’s expected earnings. There is, however, significant 
heterogeneity in A’s investment response.  
 
In 135 out of 187 (72.2% of the) joint ownership cases player B chose b = 10 and in less than 
10% of the cases player B chose b < 6. The average investment level of player B is, therefore, 
rather high and amounts to b = 8.9. Player A reciprocates to B’s high investment with a = 6.5 
on average. Regressions (3) and (4) in Table 1 provide evidence for player A’s reciprocal 
investment response. These regressions have the same structure as regressions (1) and (2) but 
are based on different data. While regressions (1) and (2) related to investment behavior under 
joint ownership where joint ownership is the initial condition, regressions (3) and (4) relate to 
behavior under joint ownership when the initial condition is given by A-ownership. Despite 
these differences in initial conditions, the A players behave very similarly, as both the size 
and the significance of the coefficient for b indicate. In fact, a rise in b by 1 unit raises A’s 
investment by 0.81 units in regressions (3) and (4). Therefore,   maximizes B’s 
expected monetary payoff.  
10b =
 
The individual investment behavior of A players, however, displays a substantial 
amount of heterogeneity (see Table 3). In 117 out of 187 (63%) cases A players exactly 
matched B’s investment choices. However, in 31% of the joint ownership cases A chose a = 1 
and in 37% of the cases a < b prevailed.  
Results 4 and 5 indicate that A players successfully elicited high investment levels by 
making B a co-owner. This raises the question whether A could do equally well by keeping 
her ownership share. Our next result therefore compares the efficiency and income levels 
under joint ownership and A-ownership when A-ownership is the initial condition.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 18
 
Table 3 
 
Investments (b,a) under Joint Ownership (AOD) 
 
                    
  b\a  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Σ   
        
  1  9          9   
  2  1          1   
  3            0   
  4     1       1   
  5  3 1  1 2      7   
  6  2     1    1 4   
  7  5 1 1    3    10   
  8  2   1 1 1  4   9   
  9  3      1 2 5  11   
  10  33 2   2  1 1 4 92 135  
 Σ   58 4 1 3 5 2 5 7 9 93 187 
                          
 
  
 
 
Result 6: If A is initially the sole owner, joint ownership is the more efficient 
allocation of ownership rights. Total investment (a+b) is higher if A makes 
B a co-owner, and both players receive a higher average payoff than 
compared to the case where A remains the sole owner and hires B as an 
employee.  
A decided to retain A-ownership and to hire B as an employee in 43 out of 230 cases (18.7%) 
B players rejected the wage offers 5 times. The average wage offer was 62.1. Almost all B 
players chose the minimum effort level (on average 1.3b = ) under A-ownership, while all A 
players chose . Thus, average total investment a + b = 11.3, which is significantly less 
than the average total investment of 15.4 if A makes B a co-owner. A’s average income under 
joint ownership is 91.4, while it is only 55.0 if she chose to retain A-ownership. B’s average 
income under joint ownership is 62.9, while he only received 44.5 if A tried to hire him as an 
employee.
10a =
                                                
12  
 
12 Even if we only consider those cases where B accepted A’s wage offer, both parties receive a lower payoff 
than under joint ownership (A: 62.2, B: 50.4).  
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While these results are again inconsistent with the self-interest model, they confirm the 
Grossman and Hart (1986) prediction that parties will always try to achieve the most efficient 
ownership structure. Our results show that independent of whether the parties originate with 
joint ownership or with A-ownership, they will always end up with joint ownership, which 
turns out to be the most efficient ownership structure. 
 
3.3. Control Treatment for Joint Ownership Design (JOD-C) 
We implemented a control treatment in Sessions S7 and S8 for the Joint Ownership Design in 
which the initial condition was also given by joint ownership. The game did not end after B 
rejected A’s offer in the control treatment, however, but continued with joint ownership. We 
have a total of 240 observations for this treatment. Again, joint ownership prevailed in the 
large majority of cases (196 of 240 observations, 81.7%). However, A players tried to sell 
their ownership stakes more frequently in this case (in 134 out of 240 cases, 55.8%). It seems 
that A players considered making an offer to be less risky because the parties reverted to the 
status quo of joint ownership if the offer was rejected. In fact, the offers were rejected 
considerably more often (in 90 out of 134 cases, 67.2%) than in the JOD treatment. Let us 
consider the three different possibilities in turn: 
• If A did not make an offer, the investment behavior is very similar to the investment 
behavior in the other designs when joint ownership prevailed. B players invested 
 on average, while A-players invested 7.0b = 6.1a =  on average. The A players’ 
reciprocal behavior is virtually identical to that we observed under joint ownership in 
JOD and AOD. 
• If A made an offer that the B player accepted, the investment behavior is very similar 
to the corresponding case in the JOD. Almost all B players invested efficiently 
(  on average), while almost all A players chose the minimum investment level 
(  on average). However, it is interesting to note that the average price of the 
accepted offers was much lower than the average accepted price in the JOD (
9.5b =
1.2a =
88.9t =  
as compared to ). This reflects the fact that B’s threat point payoff if he 
rejected the offer was not zero but the payoff resulting from the status quo of joint 
ownership. In fact, B’s average payoff after accepting A’s offer is 31.4 which is 
significantly larger than the 18.5 that he received on average when he accepted A’s 
offer in the original JOD.  
120.8t =
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• Two-thirds of all offers A players made were rejected. The average price of the 
rejected offers was 161.4, again somewhat lower than the average price of rejected 
offers in the original JOD (176.9), but still very high. After the offer was rejected, the 
two players played the investment game under joint ownership. B invested  in 
these cases, while A invested only  on average, which is significantly less than the 
investment levels under joint ownership in JOD or AOD.  
6.3b =
3.9
However, the basic ownership pattern that emerged in the control treatment is the same as in 
the two previous treatments. Joint ownership is more efficient because it induces higher total 
investments and yields higher payoffs for both players. As a consequence, joint ownership 
prevails in the large majority of cases.  
 
4. Theoretical Interpretation  
 
The predictions of the property rights approach and the self-interest model can be summarized 
as follows: 
Proposition 1: If both parties are only interested in maximizing their own 
material payoff, then  
1. A- and B-ownership are equally efficient. Both are more efficient than 
joint ownership and 
2. regardless of the initial allocation of ownership rights, the parties will 
trade ownership rights ex ante so as to set up the efficient ownership 
structure and to implement the second best optimal investment decisions.  
 
While the experimental results clearly refute the first prediction, showing that joint ownership 
is far more efficient than A- or B-ownership in all three treatments, the experiments largely 
confirm the second prediction. The parties agreed on the more efficient joint ownership 
arrangement ex ante in the large majority of all cases, regardless of whether they started from 
A-ownership or from joint ownership.  
In this section, we want to discuss whether theories of fairness are consistent with the 
experimental results. Several recent theories capture concerns for fairness and/or reciprocity 
in individual decision making. Some of the proposed models, in particular Rabin (1993) and 
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), adopt the concept of “psychological game theory” that 
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Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti (1989) introduced in order to model “intention-based 
reciprocity”. Players in these models not only have beliefs about their opponents' actions but 
also about their intentions. They are willing to reward kind and to punish unkind intentions. 
While these models convey many interesting insights, they are complicated and often difficult 
to use even in very simple applications. Furthermore, they are plagued by multiple equilibria 
even in very simple games. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) follow 
a different approach. They assume that players only care about outcomes (and not about 
intentions), but that they have “social preferences” in the sense that they dislike inequitable 
allocations. These models do not capture “reciprocity” in the intension-based sense, but rather 
“distributional fairness” or “inequity aversion”. They use standard game theoretic tools and 
they can be applied straightforwardly to any game. Furthermore, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and 
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) show that their models are consistent with many observations in 
a variety of experimental games.13  
In the following we apply the Fehr and Schmidt model to our treatment conditions. 
We will first consider the case where all players are strongly concerned about fairness. We 
will then consider the more realistic case of a heterogeneous population where some people 
are strongly concerned about fairness while others hardly care at all. The Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999) model can deal with both cases and allows for incomplete information about the types 
of the players. With heterogeneous agents, the interaction between fair and self-interested 
types comes into play and gives rise to some interesting new insights. We analyze these two 
cases in more detail in the rest of this section. 
Before we proceed we would like to stress that we do not regard our experiments as 
evidence for the claim that social preferences take the form of inequity aversion. In order to 
show the existence of inequity averse individuals simpler experiments such as those in 
Charness and Rabin (2002), Falk et al. (2003), Engelmann and Strobl (2004), or Fehr, Naef 
and Schmidt (2006) are needed. We also know from these experiments that inequity aversion 
is but one important aspect of social preferences, i.e., inequity aversion obviously does not 
provide a complete description of social preferences. Thus, the purpose of this section is not 
to show the superiority of inequity aversion over other models of social preferences14 but to 
                                                 
13 There are also a few models that try to model preferences for fair outcomes and fair intentions simultaneously, 
in particular Falk and Fischbacher (2006) and Charness and Rabin (2002). These models are more general, 
because they combine social preferences and intention-based reciprocity, but they are even less tractable for 
applications and again plagued by multiple equilibria. See Camerer (2003) and Fehr and Schmidt (2003) for 
extensive surveys and critical discussions of this literature.  
14 The Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) model makes the same qualitative predictions regarding the pattern of the 
ownership structure in the context of our treatments and it may well be that other models that take the 
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provide a simple, yet tractable, analyses that puts the interaction between selfish and fair-
minded players at the center and, thus, enables, a deeper understanding of the forces behind 
joint and individual ownership.  
  
4.1. Homogeneous  Fair Agents  
Consider first the case where all parties strongly care about fairness. We use a special case of 
the theory of inequity aversion by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) to model concerns for fairness. 
The theory assumes that some people are not only concerned about their own material payoff 
but also care about inequity or, in our context, inequality.15 The utility function of inequity 
averse (fair) players in the two-player case is given by 
 { } { }( ) max ,0 max ,0 ,i i i j i i i jU x x x x x xα β= − ⋅ − − ⋅ −  (5) 
 
{ }1,2i∈ , , where i ≠ j 1 2( , )x x x=  denotes the vector of monetary payoffs, i iβ α≤  and 
0 i 1β≤ < . The term in the utility function weighted with iα  measures the utility loss that 
stems from inequality to i ’s disadvantage, while the term weighted with iβ  measures the loss 
from advantageous inequality.  
 We assume in this subsection that all people are sufficiently concerned about fairness 
to make them always try to achieve an equal distribution of monetary payoffs, i.e. 
0.5 1iβ≤ < . This assumption implies that if player i is better off than his opponent, then he 
prefers to give one dollar to his opponent (which reduces inequality to his advantage by two 
dollars) rather than to keep this dollar for himself. However, he would not throw one dollar 
away (which reduces inequality to his advantage by one dollar) in order to reduce inequality. 
Of course, it is a very bold assumption that all people are so strongly concerned about 
inequality. This is why we will consider the case of heterogeneous agents in the next 
subsection.  
                                                                                                                                                        
heterogeneity of selfish types and social preference types seriously, also explain the major facts in our 
experiment.  
15Fairness implies that equals should be treated equally. The subjects enter the laboratory as equals in our 
experiments. They have no information about their opponents and do not know with whom they trade. Thus, in 
these very simple environments, it seems natural to define equality as the reference point for a fair payoff 
distribution. 
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Let us start with the case of joint ownership. If all players are sufficiently inequity 
averse, then player A will match B’s investment level and choose a(b)=b because this 
equalizes final payoffs. Anticipating this, player B will invest efficiently at stage 1.  
What about A-ownership? A’s investment in the last stage of the investment game 
increases her own payoff but does not affect that of B, because B receives a fixed wage 
anyway. We show that A will invest efficiently in this situation: we can distinguish two 
different ranges of possible investment levels for A (one of which may be empty) for any 
given wage w and b. Consider first the range of investment levels where A’s final payoff 
would be smaller than B’s final payoff. A wants to reduce inequality to her disadvantage in 
this range by maximizing her own payoff, i.e., A chooses a = 10. Now consider the range of 
investment levels for which A’s final payoff would exceed that of B. A further increase in A’s 
investment in this range would additionally increase the inequality to A’s advantage. 
However, if 1Aβ < , A prefers to earn one additional dollar for herself rather than to throw this 
dollar away in order to reduce the inequality towards B. Thus, she has an incentive to increase 
her investment up to the efficient amount in both cases.  
B’s investment b at the first stage of the investment game depends on the wage that A 
offered him at stage 0. If w is small, B will choose a low investment level in order to reduce 
the payoff difference between himself and A. On the other hand, if A offered a generous wage 
at stage 0 so that 1/ 2 ( *, *)w v a b= ⋅ , then B will choose the efficient investment level b* 
because he wants to increase A’s payoff in order to reduce the inequality that is now to his 
advantage. Thus, at stage 0, a fair player A will make this generous wage offer and both 
parties will choose the efficient investment levels a* and b*, respectively. The analysis of B-
ownership is analogous to that of A-ownership.  
 
Proposition 2: The ownership structure is irrelevant if both parties are 
sufficiently concerned about distributional fairness. Both parties will invest 
efficiently no matter whether there is joint, A-, or B-ownership.  
 
Thus, if concerns for fairness are universal and sufficiently strong, they induce both parties to 
invest efficiently even if investments cannot be contracted upon. Fairness suffices as an 
enforcement device, and the allocation of ownership rights does not play any role. However, 
like in the self-interest model, this prediction is clearly refuted by the experimental evidence.   
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4.2. Interaction of Self-Interested and Fair Players  
We now consider the case where some people are concerned about fairness while others are 
mainly self-interested. Furthermore, we will assume that people don’t know whether they face 
a fair and trustworthy opponent or whether their opponent is selfish and going to exploit them. 
We use the Fehr-Schmidt (1999) model of inequity aversion again, but now we allow for 
heterogeneous fairness preferences. We assume that there are 60% self-interested types 
( 0i iα β= = ) and 40% “fair” types with 2iα =  and 0.6iβ = . Thus, fair types are willing to 
share the surplus of a contract equally but also to reject offers that give them less than 40% of 
the surplus. This distribution of types is a simplification of the distribution we used in Fehr 
and Schmidt (1999).16 On the basis of these assumptions it is straightforward to solve the 
property rights game using standard game theoretic tools. The full analysis is somewhat 
lengthy and therefore relegated to an appendix that can be found on our webpage.17 In the 
following, we report the main predictions for our experiments and give the intuition for them. 
 
Analysis of the Joint Ownership Design 
The contract offer made at stage 0 may signal some information about A's type, due to the 
asymmetric information about whether A is self-interested or fair-minded. Let p denote the 
(endogenously determined) probability B assigns to the event that he faces the self-interested 
type of player A. We first analyze the players’ behaviors at the investment stage, after which 
we will examine the entire game. 
Consider first the case where A chooses to retain joint ownership at stage 0. At the 
investment stage, a self-interested type of A chooses a=1 while a fair-minded player A 
chooses a=b. Therefore, a self-interested type of B chooses b=10 if he believes that it is 
sufficiently likely that he faces a fair-minded player A, i.e. if p is sufficiently small  
                                                 
16 Note that the heterogeneity of social preferences is a well established fact (see e.g., Charness and Rabin 
(2002); Fehr and Schmidt (2003); Engelmann and Strobl (2004); Fehr, Naef and Schmidt 2006). Thus, the 
question is not whether theory should incorporate heterogeneous social preferences but which distribution of 
preferences theory should assume. In Fehr and Schmidt (1999) we used four different types: 30% of the 
population are assumed to have , 30% are assumed to have  and , 30% are 
assumed to have  and , and 10% are assumed to have 
0i iα β= = 0.5iα = 0.3iβ =1iα = 0.6iβ = 4iα =  and . It turns out to be very 
tedious to solve the model for four different types. This is why we simplified the model and use only two 
different types here. We used the same simplified distribution in Fehr and Schmidt (2004) and Fehr, Klein and 
Schmidt (2007). 
0.6iβ =
17 Please visit: http://www.vwl.uni-muenchen.de/ls_schmidt/experiments/property_rights/index.htm  . 
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(p < 10/11 = 0.91).18 Otherwise he chooses b=1. The fair-minded player B, on the other hand, 
will be more careful, because he not only suffers the monetary loss if player A does not 
reciprocate, he also suffers from the inequity that is generated if he invests while A does not. 
Therefore, the fair-minded player B will invest only if p < 10/35 = 0.29.19 This result is 
surprising. It says that if there is uncertainty about A’s type, then a self-interested player B is 
more likely to invest than the fair-minded type of B.  
Now consider the case where A tries to sell her ownership stake to B at price t. The 
self-interested type of player A finds it optimal to make a greedy offer that is going to be 
rejected by a fair-minded player B, in which case the surplus is lost. However, if the offer is 
accepted, B becomes the sole owner of the project and full residual claimant on profits. In this 
case it is a dominant strategy for both types of B to choose 10b = . The intuition is simply that 
B’s investment under B-ownership does not affect A’s payoff, so B cannot increase A’s 
payoff by investing less than the efficient amount. The self-interested type of A again chooses 
a=1. The fair-minded type of A will invest in order to reduce the inequality between herself 
and B, but only if she sold her ownership stake at a sufficiently high price to B. In fact, she 
chooses the efficient investment level if and only if .  220t ≥
We now turn to the analysis of the entire game. First, we can rule out the possibility of 
a separating equilibrium in which the self-interested type of A chooses one type of contract 
with probability 1 and the fair-minded player A chooses another contract type. The intuition is 
that the self interested player A would always want to mimic the fair player: suppose that the 
selfish type of A sells her ownership stake while the fair type retains joint ownership. Then B 
would invest 10 under joint ownership which induces the self-interested player A to deviate 
and to retain joint ownership as well. A similar argument holds for the opposite case, where 
the self interested player A sticks to joint ownership while the fair-minded player offers to 
sell. B would choose b=1 in this case if he is offered joint ownership, so the self interested 
player A is better off by selling her ownership share.  
                                                 
18 B’s expected monetary payoff if he believes he faces a selfish A-player with probability p is given by  
EUBs = p11(as+b) + (1 – p)11(af+b) – 12b. Substituting as=1 and af=b, this reduces to EUBs = 11p + (10 – 11p)b. 
Thus, if p < 10/11, B’s monetary payoff is increasing in b.  
19 The fair-minded player B is also concerned about the inequality to his advantage generated by the selfish type 
of player A. So he maximizes EUBf = p[11(as+b) – 12b – α(12b – 12as)] + (1 – p)[11(af+b) – 12b]. Substituting 
as=1 and af=b, this reduces to EUBf = 11p + 12αp + (10 – 11p – 12αp)b. Thus, if p < 10/(12α + 11), B’s utility is 
increasing in b. Substituting α = 2 we get p<10/35. 
 
 
 26
It seems very plausible in the game under consideration that retaining joint ownership 
will not be interpreted as a signal that player A is selfish. This is captured by the following 
condition:  
 
Condition 1: If A chooses to retain joint ownership, then B’s updated belief 
that he faces a self-interested type of A does not increase. 
 
This condition implies that the game has a unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: 
 
Proposition 3 [Joint Ownership Design]: With incomplete information about 
the players’ types there exists a unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium outcome 
satisfying Condition 1. The equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium in which both 
types of player A retain joint ownership. 
In the investment game the self-interested type of B chooses , while 
the fair-minded type of B chooses 
10sb =
1fb = . The self-interested type of A 
chooses 1sa = and the fair-minded type of A chooses fa b=  . 
Note that Proposition 3 differs sharply from Propositions 1 and 2. Proposition 1 
assumed that the fact that all players are self-interested is common knowledge. No ownership 
structure implements first-best investments in this case, but A- and B-ownership are strictly 
better than joint ownership. Proposition 2 assumed that all players are fair-minded. Any 
allocation of ownership rights in this case implements first-best investment decisions and the 
allocation of ownership rights is indeterminate. Proposition 3 shows, like Proposition 1, that 
first-best investments cannot be implemented with incomplete information about the players’ 
types, but that the second-best allocation of ownership rights is the unique equilibrium 
outcome. However, in contrast to Proposition 1, joint ownership is optimal in this case. Thus, 
the ownership prediction of Proposition 3 is largely consistent with the experimental evidence 
of the JOD. 
In the control treatment JOD-C the game did not end when A’s  offer to sell her share 
was rejected. Instead, the game continued with joint ownership. This improves B’s threat 
point payoff when A chooses to make an offer which makes it less attractive for A to sell her 
share to B. On the other hand, it is less risky for A to make an offer, because if her offer is 
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rejected, the parties are just back to joint ownership. Nevertheless, the Appendix shows that 
Proposition 3 still applies on the equilibrium path, so the prediction for this control 
experiment is the same, again consistent with the experimental evidence of JOD-C.  
 
Analysis of the A-Ownership Design 
In this design A is initially the sole owner of the project. At stage 0 she can choose whether to 
remain the sole owner and hire B as an employee at wage , or to give half of the ownership 
rights to B, in which case there is joint ownership.  
w
If A opts for joint ownership, the analysis is the same as in the previous subsection. Let us 
now suppose that she decides to retain A-ownership and hire B as an employee. A self-
interested type of player A finds it optimal to make a greedy wage offer that is going to be 
rejected by the fair-minded type of B. However, if the wage offer is accepted, the choice of 
a=10 is a dominant strategy for both the self-interested and the fair-minded owner at the 
investment stage (as in the case of B-ownership above). Consider now player B's investment 
choice. Anticipating A's investment, the self-interested player B clearly chooses b=1. The 
fair-minded player B also chooses b=1 if his wage is sufficiently small (w<67). Otherwise he 
will choose b so as to equalize payoffs. This parallels the analysis of B-ownership in the 
previous subsection. 
Consider now stage 0. The self-interested player B will accept the contract offered by 
A if and only if . The fair-minded player B accepts any contract where . Thus, 
only the self-interested type of B will accept an offer of w = 12. If A offers  both types 
of B will accept the offer, yielding a higher payoff.
12w ≥ 56w ≥
56w =
20 It is easy to show that offering more 
than 56 reduces A’s payoff, so a self-interested player A will offer 56w = which is accepted 
by both types of B. The fair-minded player A wants to equalize payoffs and offers 67w = , 
which is also accepted by both types of player B. Hence, the theory of inequity aversion 
predicts the same investment levels as the self-interest theory, but it differs in the prediction 
of the wages offered to B. 
Let us now turn to the entire game. Again, if we are willing to impose a condition that 
parallels Condition 1, we get a unique equilibrium prediction. 
 
                                                 
20 The minimum wage that both types of player B accept depends on the value of α. However, the A-player will 
choose joint ownership in equilibrium for all α > 0.5.  
 
 28
Condition 1’: If A offers a joint ownership contract and gives half of the firm's 
revenues to B, then B’s updated belief that he faces the self-interested type of A 
does not increase. 
 
Proposition 4 [A-Ownership Design]: With incomplete information about the 
players types there exists a unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium outcome 
satisfying Condition 1’. The equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium in which both 
types of A offer a joint ownership contract which both types of player B accept. 
The equilibrium outcome is the same as under joint ownership described in 
Proposition 3. 
 
Thus, Propositions 3 and 4 predict that the players will always end up with joint 
ownership, regardless of the initial allocation of ownership rights. Joint ownership 
does not implement first best investment decisions. However, it still outperforms A- 
(or B-)ownership. Both parties invest with a significant probability under joint 
ownership, while only the owner invests under A- (or B-)ownership and the other 
party opts for the minimum investment. Furthermore, A has to hire B as an employee 
under A-ownership, and there is a significant probability that a fair-minded player B 
will reject a wage offer that he perceives as unfair. Similarly, if A sells her ownership 
stake in the joint ownership design there is again some probability that this offer is 
going to be rejected. Therefore, the model of inequity aversion predicts that joint 
ownership is more efficient. This is in contrast to the self-interest model that predicts 
A- (or B-) ownership to be more efficient. However, both models support the Coase 
Theorem which suggests that the parties will adopt the ownership structure that is 
most efficient independent of the initial allocation of ownership rights. Again, the 
ownership prediction of the theory of inequity aversion with heterogeneous types is 
largely consistent with the experimental evidence of this treatment. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Our experiments confirm the property rights approach by showing that the ownership 
structure affects relationship-specific investments and that the subjects achieve the most 
efficient ownership allocation starting from different initial conditions. However, in our 
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experiments the most efficient ownership structure is joint ownership, which contrasts with 
the property rights approach. Of course, joint ownership is not always optimal. Our 
experimental and theoretical analysis suggests that joint ownership is more likely to be 
optimal if the number of partners is small, if the free-rider problem is not too severe, and if 
there is no other way to contract on the relationship specific investments of the partners. This 
may explain why joint ownership is often observed in small firms in the service industries 
mentioned in the introduction, but much less frequently in larger firms.  
Our results are neither consistent with the self-interest model nor with models that 
assume that all people behave fairly, but they are largely consistent with the theory of inequity 
aversion that focuses on the interaction between selfish and fair players. The theory suggests 
that the reason for the superiority of joint ownership is that it makes better (but still imperfect) 
use of fairness as an enforcement device than does A- or B-ownership.  
In a recent paper, Oliver Hart (2001) argues that “although norms are undoubtedly 
very important both inside and between firms, incorporating them into the theory has been 
very difficult and is likely to continue to be so in the near future” and that “a norm-free theory 
of the firm and a norm-rich theory of the firm don’t seem to have very different predictions”. 
He mainly examined models of repeated games that try to capture norms that are based on 
repeated interactions of self-interested players. In this paper, we have shown that the recent 
advances in modeling fairness in one-shot games provide powerful tools for incorporating 
norms of fair behavior into contract theory. This allows us to derive testable predictions on 
the optimal allocation of ownership rights, some of which differ significantly from the 
standard predictions of the self-interest model. Thus, our experiments as well as the 
theoretical analysis suggest that if we want to understand the incentive effects of real 
institutions on real people, concerns for fairness should be taken into account.  
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